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Abstract
The focus of the thesis is a gradual collapse of the incentives
structure over the last twenty years at a large-scale manufacturing
enterprise Arsenal in Kiev (Ukraine). The major question in this case-
study is the following: "Does the incentives structure matter in the design
of a large-scale privatization program in Ukraine?" The answer to this
question in the thesis is positive. It is also argued that restructuring of the
enterprise through fragmentation should proceed before its privatization.
Such sequence of the enterprise reform could allow for a new incentives
structure to emerge, and could stop further deterioration of Arsenal's work
force, now heavily subsidized from the state budget.
Despite monetarization of exchange in the economy, at Arsenal
incentives for higher productivity and innovation do not emerge. A
major reason for this is that the old governance structure of the enterprise
does not live up to the realities of liberalizing economy. Deterioration of
skills, disappearance of the on-the-job training, and the spread of hidden
unemployment are among the consequences of the Soviet-style
management. In face of potential unemployment, top managers provide
employees with basic job security and subsistence-level wages and in
exchange the employees agree to ally with top managers in the course of
the enterprise's privatization. However, according to the high-skilled
workers and middle managers a mere privatization of Arsenal will not
solve the problems of incentives.
These problems today are partially resolved through informal
arrangements, which essentially allow less efficient workers and units to
survive on the expense of more efficient ones. A fragmentation of the
enterprise would help its more viable units not only to survive the
transition but also grow and become more attractive to investors.
Although the fragmentation is not an ideal solution to Arsenal's problems,
it seems to be more feasible under the current macro-economic conditions.
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Introduction
It is ironic to note ... that major changes in
centrally planned economies never took place
according to a "central plan." There is a Chinese adage
which talks of "crossing the river by touching the
stones." The reform process in socialist economies
conformed exactly to this image: whole societies
proceeded to cross the deep water without accurate
knowledge about the final destination by a process of
moving from one stone to another.
Jdnos Kornail
My studies in the United States became possible because Ukraine
opened to the West. I hope this was not just a small window of
opportunity for a few of my generation. In my view, a continuity of this
openness will depend in large measure on the success of economic reforms
in my country. The economic reforms, already introduced in Ukraine,
have so far improved the quality of life of a relatively small number of
people. Since many political constraints are removed, why then do the
majority of people still remain economically passive? Why are private
businesses emerging so slowly, and why so little foreign capital is attracted
to Ukraine or Russia? Of course, these are very general questions, but in
the same time in both countries they are in the center of a current policy
analysis and decision-making .
On my way to Ukraine in January 1995, I became involved in a
conversation with a German entrepreneur. He was going to Ukraine to
cancel a contract he signed with a Ukrainian radio-technical manufacturer
two years ago. Apparently the Ukrainian manager he dealt with, had not
fulfilled a single obligation of the contract, and the state also interfered
with the project, making it even more difficult to implement. In addition,
lawyers from abroad were unable to help him to find a way out of the legal
confusion he found in Ukraine. The businessman's life was threatened by
an anonymous group that demanded that he deliver a promised
investment. "How can one do business in a country like this," he said, "It's
not even a Third World. There, at least people work if you pay them well.
Slavs will never get the work done, it's probably in their culture."
1 Kornai, Jinos. 1991. "The Affinity Between Ownership Forms and Coordination
Mechanisms: the Common Experience of Reform in Socialist Countries." The Reemergence of
Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World ed. by Kazimierz
Poznanski. Westview Press, p. 99.
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I was not sure how to react to such comments. Obviously, I have
always identified with this part of the world. "Is this in my culture,
indeed?" It was not the first time I asked myself this question. I have
heard similar comments from other Western businessmen during my
three-years as an interpreter in the United States. In one case, the city
administration did not want to give "the green light" to a hotel renovation
in the capital's downtown, in another, workers of a manufacturing
enterprise did not want to work for $100, although it was ten times higher
than their official monthly wage. Until now I was unable to understand
why such paradoxes exist, what is the matter with our people, or with the
companies and institutions they represent.
Going to Ukraine as a would-be planner to conduct a research for my
thesis I was not still clear about the question which I had to answer.
My conversation with the German businessman confused me even more.
On one hand, he blamed the Ukrainian managers and the state, on the
other, he was blaming the whole culture for the failure of his project.
Actors he did not mention, however, were the workers of the enterprise.
When I brought them into the discussion, the businessman looked at me
with suspicion. I became aware that if I continue he would see me as a
hopeless Marxist.
This encounter influenced my decision to do a case-study. I believe
such a study could help Western businessmen and policy-makers (whose
framework of thinking excludes important actors from their projects) to
narrow a gap in understanding of the economic problems Ukraine is
facing. For example, in the restructuring on a micro-level the state as an
actor is usually excluded in the stabilization and privatization programs
advocated by Western economic consultants, and the workers do not figure
as actors in the projects of Western businessmen.
I realized that whatever the problems of a Ukrainian enterprise
might be (whether they are related to the obsolete and illogical accounting
system, or to the managerial rent-seeking, or to the state intervention into
enterprises' foreign deals), they have to be presented in such a way as to be
of practical significance to both individual and institutional foreign
investors. In attempting a case-study I wanted to find out what makes
most of the Ukrainian enterprises today dysfunction; and the majority of
their employees unproductive, and what could be done about it.
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Since there were very few studies in the West on the history of
Russian and the Soviet firms,2 and none dealing with the Ukrainian firms,
I found it necessary to place the subject matter in some historical context.
With some background knowledge of the Soviet industry from my
undergraduate research at the Kiev Economic University, I decided to
interview workers, managers, state bureaucrats. I also interviewed grass-
roots activists, foreign consultants and businessmen.3
In 1991 the Soviet system of centralized economic planning began to
disintegrate in Ukraine. Since then the country's industrial production
and real wages have decreased by roughly fifty per cent, its open and
hidden unemployment accounted for about twenty five per cent of the
work force, and the inflation soared by more than 10,000 per cent in 1993
alone. At the same time, according to the most conservative estimations,
almost half of country's GNP is produced in the underground, or shadow
economy.4
Implementation of the IMF stabilization program for Ukraine began
in January 1995, and the large-scale privatization is a central part of it. This
includes the privatization of about a hundred of the large-scale
monopolistic enterprises (so-called "red giants"), located mostly in the
eastern and central Ukraine. When this privatization will be implemented
is a question in itself, but even more important question is how it is going
to be implemented in view of continuing absence of a legal structure in
Ukraine.
Several students of transition economies (Amsden (1994), Yavlinsky
(1994), and others) have warned that the IMF and the World Bank
programs essentially assume that privatization will make enterprises more
efficient and will help the economy to "get the prices right." The authors
have argued that clever industrial policies are needed to de-monopolize
economies of Eastern Europe, and to allow for a new incentives structure
to emerge. Unfortunately, very few decision makers in Ukraine (both on
the "conservative," communist side, and on the "liberal," reformist side)
believe that industrial policy is a priority.
2 The most comprehesive of them were done by Berliner (1957, 1976) and Tugan-Baranovsky
(1938).
3 With the grant support from the center for European Studies at Harvard University, I was
able to conduct fifteen one-hour interviews.
4 From an interview with Olexander Savchenko, the EBRD Executive Director, and his
report presented at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, on March 17, 1995.
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To answer the question what makes the enterprise dysfunctional,
one has to analyze the evolution of its governance structure, and to answer
what makes the employees passive, one has to examine the evolution of
the incentives structure.5 Thus, the major question of the thesis reverses a
question asked by Stiglitz (1994): "Does ownership matter for the design of
incentives structure?"6 The case-study presented here, demonstrates that
there is a dialectical relationship between the form of ownership and the
incentives structure.
The argument in the thesis is that privatization by itself may not
bring the expected efficiency and higher productivity. To allow for a new
incentives structure to develop, the state needs to restructure its large-scale
enterprises before privatizing them. Arguments against restructuring
come mostly from the top managers ("red directors" as the media calls
them), who want to secure their power and control over the assets. They
claim that restructuring will cause mass unemployment, and will destroy a
"human capital" that accumulated over the decades.
Thus, the research part of the thesis is devoted to two questions.
First, what were Arsenal's employees' incentives before the transition,
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Secondly, how these incentives are
changing in the 1990s with the monetarization of the economy. I try to
answer these questions by developing a typology of Arsenal's employees
first, and it includes high-skilled workers, low-skilled workers, middle
managers, and the top managers. Subsequently, I study these groups'
incentives under the changing technological, budgetary, and market
constraints over the last twenty years.
First I discuss a problem of the deterioration of the old incentives
structure at Arsenal, a typical phenomenon for the post-Soviet industry as
a whole. I link this deterioration to a military-technological competition
between the USSR and the US during the Cold War, as well as to
increasing openness of the Soviet society to the West and the scientific and
technological progress. Thus, I try to establish a relationship between the
incentives structure of the Soviet-type enterprise and its governance
5 My definition of an incentives structure includes three components: material
compensation for one's work (both monetary and non-monetary), a social status which a
given job provides, and the meaning, or vocation, which an individual finds in his or her
work. As we will see later, because material compansation was often provided for
merely holding a job rather than individual performance, the role of the two other
incentives in a socialist system was crucial.
6 Stiglitz, Joseph. 1994. Whither Socialism? Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 81.
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regime, including working class Marxist-Leninist ideology and the value
system.
In the second chapter I discuss a gradual collapse of the incentives
structure along with erosion of the governance regime. The discussion is
divided into three parts: (1) the context in which large-scale enterprises in
Ukraine functioned until recently, (2) the goals and the implications of the
1973 industrial reform, (3) the goals and the implications of the 1986 wage
reform. To facilitate innovation, the industrial reform significantly
increased the size of the enterprise, and narrowed down the wage
differentials among the different employment groups. To increase
productivity, the wage reform in turn, delegated more authority from the
state to the top managers, and widened the wage differentials.
The third chapter is devoted to the problem of employees'
incentives under the transition. Here I argue that from the perspective of
the middle managers and the high-skilled workers, both reforms failed to
solve the problems of incentives. The primary reason for these failures
was that an accounting of the individual units' performance remained
centralized on the level of the state (after the first reform), and on the level
of the enterprise (after the second reform).
In this context, an emergence of managerial paternalism and
subsequent "informalization" of incentives might be seen as a consequence
of these failures. I argue that today the top managers capitalize on workers'
helplessness, 7 an outcome of their socio-economic, political, and personal
dependence on their employers. If in the past, the lack of incentives made
workers dependent on the state and the Communist Party, now this
dependence became more informal, and more difficult to change.
Although at Arsenal the old incentives structure (including the
system of social benefits) collapsed, it was not replaced by the formal
changes in the organizational structure of the enterprise. There are no
formal changes in the employment relations between the three groups of
employees: high-skilled workers, low-skilled workers, and middle
managers. The top managers' relations with the state were not affected as
well.
The fourth chapter of the thesis contains recommendations for the
enterprise reform, based on the preceding analysis. Here, I argue that the
7 Amsden, Alice and Jacek Kochanowicz, Lance Taylor. 1994. The Market Meets Its Match:
Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.
200.
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incentives structure can only be changed when the governance structure of
the enterprise is changed. This change I believe, can be attained through
fragmentation - splitting the enterprise into the smaller units.
The fragmentation in my view, would benefit the high-skilled
workers and the middle managers in the civilian and to some extent
defense-related units. Most of the employees are now virtually
unemployed. Despite their subsistence-level earnings, the middle-aged
workers are not eager to leave the bankrupt enterprise to compete for jobs
in the private sector, represented now for the most part by commerce and
services. Their flexible skills and the commitment, however, could help
them significantly to survive the transition.
Here, the policy implication is that only after Arsenal's
fragmentation its fully autonomous and accountable units (i.e., plants or
even shop-floors) could be privatized. Such a strategy would help its more
viable units not only to survive the transition, but also grow in the future.
Today the profits of the more viable units are used to subsidize the
production of the inefficient ones. Thus, the fragmentation can be a crucial
pre-condition for a new incentives structure, and help the macro-economic
reform as well.
1. Labor Under Transition: a Theoretical Framework
[In a socialist enterprise] chronic labor
shortage forms the basis of workers'
bargaining with management
David Stark8
The mainstream discussion of the post-socialist transition in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union has centered around the neo-classical
models of macroeconomic stabilization. It is not surprising since these
models provide the basis for the IMF and the World Bank stabilization
programs in those countries.
A general neo-classical framework for analyzing the effects of
economic reforms on labor markets and its central problems -
unemployment and wages, was developed by Blanchard (1993). It presents
the following argument: In the course of reforms, the old public sector
8 Stark, David. 1986. "Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insights From a
Comparative Perspective." American Sociological Review 51: 494.
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gradually erodes, a private sector (providing new incentives to employees)
is growing, and large-scale enterprises give a way to the medium- and
small-scale ones. As a result of changes in the ownership structure and of
overall economic decline (including heavy-industrial conversion,
enterprise closures, etc.), state firms are shedding labor, creating
unemployment in the process of these reallocations.
There can be two views in interpreting these processes. The first
one, more pessimistic, would stress that if the private sector grows slower
than the public one collapses, and subsequently if there is lagging in the
reallocation of the work force, the unemployment may rapidly become a
large stagnant pool. This pool is associated with high economic and social
costs, because it can place at risk the whole reform process.
The second, more optimistic view, is that the private sector has a
comparative advantage before the public sector and it "steals" workers
from the state enterprises, and by that forces the latter to reorganize.
Unemployment is seen as a healthy by-product of privatization and
liberalization, and even if the unemployment pool is large, it has a high
turnover necessary for an efficient restructuring.
Neither of these two scenarios is realized (at least now) in the post-
socialist economies, where stagnant unemployment pools are relatively
small. What is happening in Ukraine, for example, is that labor is being
"suspended" between the public and private sector (i. e., most employees
find themselves in a state of "limbo" when they don't work in the public
sector, although formally they keep their jobs there). A clue for
understanding this phenomenon is in the relationship between the
workers and the top managers.
This type of relationship was discussed in a relatively small number
of studies, mostly sociological: Burawoy (1993), Flitzer (1994), Stark (1994,
1986), Szelenyi (1988), Walder (1986), and others. These authors, drawing
upon the work of Kornai (1980) on one hand, and the theory of internal
labor markets, developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971), on the other, argue
that until recently competitive labor markets did not exist in the socialist
economies, as well as markets for capital and land. Chronic shortage of the
factors of production, and especially labor, was closely associated with the
command principle, around which the whole socialist institutional
structure was organized. Full employment, artificially maintained through
labor hoarding, was a characteristic feature of over-centralized economies.
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Walder (1986) suggests that to understand a real dynamic of post-
socialist transition, one has to look at the large-scale enterprises and the
incentives structure of their employees. This structure will be quite
different from that of a typical Western firm because it is formed under a
set of fundamentally different factors: labor in a large socialist firm is a
fixed rather than variable, capital; its employment does not fluctuate
according to the demand for a firm's products; wages and conditions of
employment are not subject to formal bargaining; labor and management
are not recognized as separate parts; wage scales are set by the state, etc.9
The authors suggest that one cannot model the behavior of the work
force in the post-socialist economies on the neo-classical assumptions. One
of the reasons for that is a deep link between the incentive structure and
the working-class ideology. Although the authors do not provide an
explicit analytical framework for the analysis of the incentives structure,
their diagnosis of the social conflicts and economic inefficiencies in the
post-socialist states points to the relationship between the incentives and
the ownership structure in the large-scale firms.
Most large-scale enterprises in post-socialist economies were owned
and controlled by the state. They employed more than third of the work
force in many post-socialist economies, and especially in Ukraine and
Russia. In the past, a "soft budget constraint," and a self-perpetuating
macro-economic shortage of the major factors of production, including
labor, forced these enterprises to develop informal internal mechanisms to
adjust to the uncertainties produced by the Soviet-type hierarchies:
Analysis of systemic uncertainties and the organizational
responses of workers and managers yields a comparative
model of mirrored opposition: in economies in which the
firm operates in a market environment, systemic
uncertainties regarding labor are reduced through internal
bureaucratic rules operating according to a classificatory logic.
In the socialist economy, by contrast, where systemic
uncertainties are produced by a bureaucratic environment, the
firm responds through internal market transactions based on
affiliative ties.10
There were at least two major reasons for the emergence of the
informal, market-type relations between workers and managers at the
9 Walder, Andrew. 1986. Communist Neo-Traditionalism. Work and Authority in
Chinese Industry. Berkley: University of California Press, p. 11.
10 Stark, David. 1986. "Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insights From a
Comparative Perspective." American Sociological Review, 51: 492.
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large-scale industrial enterprises. 11 First, the chronic shortage of supplies
gave rise to a peculiar socialist practice - "storming" (shturmovshchina). It
was characterized by a slow work at the start of a production cycle (month,
quarter, or year), followed by a rush to meet the plan target at the cycle's
end, when supplies suddenly became available. Although workers agreed
to work overtime, this unwritten concession gave them a bargaining
power on the important issues (especially social benefits). That eventually
led to the emergence of informal institutions within the enterprise.
Secondly, the enterprises were unevenly mechanized. Production
shops were more highly mechanized that auxiliary operations, which
formed bottlenecks and soaked up a larger part of the work force. Another
bottleneck was the shortage of spare parts, fastenings, and small tools. The
shortage of these items and their non-standardization compelled the
enterprise to manufacture them in its own workshops under labor-
intensive and highly wasteful and costly conditions. This particular
shortage was directly related to a disproportionately high auxiliary sector.
Workers in auxiliary operations performed numerous tasks only
indirectly related to the production, such as internal transport, loading and
unloading, packing, warehousing, quality control, cleaning, maintenance,
etc. Most of these jobs were low-skilled, and much harder to control
because of their mostly manual or crude technological level. These jobs
involved almost half of the work force in many large enterprises. The
need to retain large numbers of low-skilled workers created a perpetual
labor shortage, which in turn also provided these workers with a
bargaining power.
Stark (1986) and Burawoy (1993) suggest that some elements of the
labor market have developed at the large-scale enterprises, job competition
is one of them. What workers were competing for if the centralized system
of wages tried to keep wage differentials minimal?12 The goal of
competition among the core workers (directly involved in production) and
auxiliary workers (indirectly involved in production) was the same - to
establish solid personal informal relations with managers. However, the
modes of this competition among the two groups of workers were quite
different.
11 See Filtzer (1994).
12 For example, a wage ratio between the general manager and a trainee worker was about
3:1.
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Shortages of raw materials and equipment required much more
diverse skills from the core workers than those specified in the formal job
descriptions. For example, the core workers had to be able to make tools
that were not in supply, or even redesign a product, or some part of it
when the drawings were faulty. 13 Making oneself an "irreplaceable" core
worker with the unique and often firm-specific skills, constituted means of
establishing informal relation with managers, and getting a quicker access
to the enterprise's "non-monetary," or "social" benefits such as housing,
healthcare, consumer services and products that were in deficit.
In contrast, auxiliary workers' competition was centered around
informal exchange activities. A low technical level of these workers' labor
made job evaluation very difficult, and some other mechanism had to be
developed instead. Indeed, managers heavily relied on certain workers,
who could provide some basic discipline and achieve a basic level of
productivity. On one hand, the selection of these workers, was based on
countless political criteria - membership in a communist party, trade
union, etc. On the other hand, it was based on trust, because it usually
involved an informal exchange of favors, especially the material ones.
In other words, the formal incentives structure present at the large-
scale enterprises has never been fully satisfying for both categories of
workers. One of the consequence of this was the evolution of specific trust
relations between the managers and the employees. Trust was developed
in the course of a long-term relationship between workers and managers.
Understandably, the latter tried to keep the best of the workers in their
places, in the same time limiting their mobility. Rewards for this limited
mobility were usually provided in the course of individual bargaining. For
example, for a worker to establish such a relationship with a manager, a
mere membership in the political organization was not enough. He or she
had to have important "higher-place" connections outside of the
enterprise, or to know someone, who socialized with his or her manager.
In other cases a long term job commitment had to be demonstrated.
Thus, there were at least two quite different modes of adjustment to
the so-called "forced equality" and to the counter-effective organization of
production. One was based on a "patron-client" principle of reciprocity,
and second - on a principle similar to that of supply and demand.
Workers who have chosen skills-oriented competition had a somewhat
13 Such practice could develop because of organizational mis-matches between the
productive and auxiliary work.
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different value system than those for whom the competition was
essentially a participation in the informal exchange transactions. However,
both categories of employees developed informal relations with managers
based on trust. This trust still plays a crucial role under the transition,
because it provides an opportunity for the top managers to establish a new
"social contract" with the employees.
In the period of transition, when the system of "non-monetary"
benefits is collapsing, the described customs come into conflict with
employees' spontaneous actions toward re-organization of the enterprise.
For example, the high-skilled employees and managers of the units
involved in the production for export try to disconnect their units from
those with low-quality production, designed for domestic markets. The
same could be said about employees involved in civilian production as
opposed to defense-related production.
In this place one would ask a question: what about the low-skilled
auxiliary workers, whose job choices were motivated largely by a desire to
move from rural to the urban areas? In Ukraine now, most of them are on
the long-term unpaid administrative leaves (but not officially
unemployed), and spend most of their leisure time working in the villages
where their relatives live. The top managers do not want to lose these
workers because they can use them as a leverage in bargaining with the
state for credits.
Some authors conclude that it is still unclear whether it is the state
or the top managers who retain auxiliary workers at their jobs, and the
informal exchange networks in their place. The informal bonds between
the top management and their employees may play a destructive role for
the economy, contributing to the hidden unemployment, corruption, and
political lobbying.
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2. Employees' Incentives Before the Transition
The failure to provide incentives is
generally viewed as a central reason for
the failure of the Soviet system.
Joseph Stiglitz14
2. 1. Soviet Enterprise in Ukraine: a Background
Ukraine's large-scale manufacturing enterprises were created in the
1920s and 1930s as a result of the rapid industrialization policies adopted in
Russia. By 1991 they constituted the core of the economy, producing up to
seventy percent of its material product and employing up to thirty percent
of the work force. Large-scale enterprises were monopolists on the
domestic (Soviet) market. Most of them combined civilian and defense-
related production under the jurisdiction of the all-union ministries in
Moscow. 15 These ministries (on behalf of the state) owned and controlled
the enterprise, planned its output, employed its work force, and purchased
its products.
As a result of this situation, transactions between the state and the
large-scale enterprises and among the latter were based on barter. It was a
sheer necessity because the state paid for products that were not yet
produced, while the production process had to be maintained from one
payment period to another. The virtual absence of the monetary exchange
in classical socialist system made money simply an unit of account in
presence of the non monetary exchange with government planning:
Money acted as a simple bookkeeping tool, while the
distribution of resources was decided by state planning
agencies. The famous soft budget constraint was nothing
more than a simple reflection of this fact. Physical plans must
be fulfilled at any cost, and money does not matter.16
As prices were liberalized in 1991, and the economy became more
open to international markets, money started to perform its three major
functions (a store of value, a medium of exchange, and a unit of account).
14 Stiglitz, Joseph. 1994. Whither Socialism? Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 68.
15 There were three levels of jurisdiction for the enterprises - all-union, republican, and
local. The so-called "strategic" large-scale heavy industries (machinery, metalwork, etc)
were subordinated to nine all-union ministries in Moscow. Light industry and construction
was subordinated to the republican ministries, while services and small-scale food
processing - to the local administrations.
16 Yavlinsky, Grigory and Serguey Braguinsky. 1994. "The Inefficiency of Lassez-Faire in
Russia: Hysterisis Effects and the Need for Policy-Led Transformation," Journal of
Comparative Economics. 19: 98.
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Today, when the real value of resources is widely recognized, the raw
materials and the means of production originally viewed by managers just
as sources of physical output, now are perceived as important sources of
private capital formation.
The soft budget constraint, easily sustained in closed socialist
economy with the limited role of monetary exchange, led to inflationary
pressure in the conditions of liberalizing economy. Monopolies
immediately increased prices for their products, and since the state was no
longer paying for them, enterprises accumulated debts both to the central
bank and to each other (as they were unable to pay for the supplies).
The state also no longer plans enterprises' production, investment,
and distribution. The only concern which the state has is the fate of
enterprises' employees, whose wages are still subsidized from the state
budget. In this situation, the top managers start to play an especially crucial
role as intermediaries between the state and the employees. This position
of "middlemen" provides the top managers with an opportunity to acquire
power and control over the enterprises' physical capital.
Before the transition, growth of the enterprises was "extensive,"
primarily due to the increase in inputs such as capital, labor, and natural
resources. This is in contrast to "intensive" growth through innovation,
improvement of product quality, exploitation of gains from international
trade, and constant cost reduction. 17 As many social scientists pointed out,
the collapse of the Soviet system in the late 1980s proved that in the long
run "extensive" growth could not be sustained.
In the present day situation, large-scale enterprises and the state
(as their absolute owner in the past and potential share-holder in the
future) must undergo several transitions at once: (1) transition from the
state to the private form of ownership; (2) transition from the barter to
the monetary form of exchange; (3) transition from the military to the
civilian production; (4) transition from an "extensive" to an
"intensive" pattern of growth (from the "soft" to the "hard" budget
constraint); (5) transition from monopolistic to competitive economy;
(6) transition from "closed" to "open" economy; and (7) the transition
from the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the working class to a new kind of
ideology, which must accommodate the ideas of private property and
1 7 Winkler, Georg. 1992. Central and Eastern Europe Roads to Growth, ed. by Georg
Winkler,
Washington: IMF and Austrian National Bank, p. 5.
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individual responsibility. 18 All of these seven transformations, in our
view, mirror the transformation of the governance regime of the
enterprises.
Under the Soviet system large-scale heavy-industrial enterprises
were called "strategic" not only because their production was defense-
related, but because the production of means of production (as Stalin's
"Law of Planned Proportional Development" emphasized) was the main
source of the socialist economic growth and not the production of
consumer goods or services.
Among the consequences of such thinking about growth and
development were "path dependent" (ot dostignutogo), cost-based 19
planning, and the accounting system unable to deal with the concept of
amortization:
Once accumulation was embodied in a material asset such as a
machine, it was hard to accept that over time the material
embodiment had become obsolete and should be scrapped,
even though it was still working at or close to its design
capacity... As a result, large quantities of technically obsolete
machines were kept in operation, holding back productivity
levels and causing diminishing returns to investment.20
The third consequence of such approach to planning were barriers to
innovation and decreasing productivity. The latter created problems for
the top managers rather than for the state. On the one hand, the top
managers had to fulfill the technical, industrial and financial plan
(tekhpromfinplan), broken into annual, quarterly and monthly output
targets according to "main assortment" indicators (nomenklatura). On the
other hand, the top managers had to fight for a soft budget constraint.
Enterprises' adjustment to bureaucratic environment took place
through manipulation of the approved and true production figures.
Under the conditions of constant uncertainty, the top managers would
either conceal additional incomes (if there were any) or, more often, would
not report the true enterprises' inventories:
18 The slowness of the last transition is central to understanding why the emergence of
the new formal incentive structure lags behind the informal arrangements which are
being established at the enterprise.
19 Prices were calculated on the basis of costs (zatratnyj printsip), rather than profits.
20 Allen, Mark. 1992. "IMF-Supported Adjustment in central and Eastern Europe." In
Central and Eastern Europe Roads to Growth, ed. by Georg Winkler. Washington: IMF and
Austrian National Bank, p. 31.
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This means that Soviet managers had incentives to innovate
provided that they could choose the rate at which the effects of
those improvements were made known to the state.2 1
Such informal arrangements were detrimental for the enterprises'
work force, especially for the engineering and technical personnel and
high-skilled workers. Their jobs often did not reflect their skills, and
starting in the 1970s, their wages leveled and approximated those of lower-
skill employees. Under the transition, the lack of incentives forced a large
number of the skilled employees to quit their jobs for a growing private
sector.
Ukrainian industrial enterprises have more hidden jobless rate that
any other country in Central and Eastern Europe. According to a recent
survey by the International Labor Organization an open unemployment is
likely to soar in 1995 as the IMF and the World Bank's stabilization
program is being implemented. 22 The survey, covering 348 manufacturing
enterprises that employ over 372,000 workers, suggests that the true
unemployment rate in Ukraine is already exceeding twenty percent
compared with the official Ministry of Labor rate of one percent of the work
force.
In addition, some twelve percent of workers are on long-term
unpaid "administrative" leaves, a few more are on partially-paid leaves,
and a large number of other workers are on compulsory short-term
working leaves. ILO also indicates that there is growing under-group of
poor workers paid much less than their counterparts, partly due to a "tax-
based incomes" policy adopted by Ukraine under pressure from the IMF for
loan qualification. Because the policy involves a punitive tax on average
wage rises, managers are lowering wages for some groups to allow for a
higher pay for privileged workers.
2. 2. Industrial Reform of 1973 and Narrowing of the Wage Differentials
In 1969 the US astronauts landed on the moon, and this event
overshadowed the space achievements (and associated with them military
technological superiority) of the Soviet Union. To stay in the competition
with the U.S. the Communist Party at that time decided to speed up
research and innovation by combining institutes, design bureaus and
21 Pejovich, Steve. 1990. "A Property Rights Analysis of Perestroika." Communist
Economies, 2(2): 162.
22 ILO-CEE Report on Ukraine, 1994. Geneva and Prague.
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enterprises into amalgamated associations that would reduce
organizational barriers for what was known in Russian as NTP (scientific
and technical progress). This decision of the elites raised many objections,
and debates continued until 1973 when industrial centralization was finally
accomplished. The agreement for US-Soviet space cooperation signed
during the visit to the USSR of President Nixon in 1972 facilitated the
adoption of this reform in many ways.
This 1973 reform was especially important for Ukraine, where more
than eighty percent of the aero-space, missile and other advanced
machinery production of the Soviet Union was located. Arsenal, one of
the major defense contractors of the all-union subordination, became one
of the first of Ukrainian enterprises to be transformed into an NPO
(scientific-production association). Many small- and mid-size plants and
design bureaus of different profiles and subordination were associated
under the "roof" of Arsenal.
In part as a result of this reform, and to some extent because of the
growing labor shortage (a demographic outcome of the W.W.II and the
1930s Stalin's famine in Ukraine), wages of the so-called ITR (engineering-
technical workers) leveled, and as never before began to approach those of
the skilled manual workers. As a consequence of that, many experienced
masters (foremen) abandoned their work for managerial positions (it
should be noted that managers were not trained professionally at that
time). As these workers report in the interviews, although a managerial
job did not provide a much higher wage than a foreman's job, it did
provide a quicker access to the social benefits, such as housing, for
example.23 This was very disappointing for younger workers for whom
the foremen were also their mentors (nastavniki).
There were several reasons for disappointment. Younger workers
came to the enterprise in the late 1950s-early 1960s and were trained by the
older masters who worked in Arsenal since the 1940s. For majority of the
masters their work was their life, their calling (prizvanije). They could
have not imagine themselves without their shop-floor and their tools. At
that time to be a master meant that one had to be acquainted with (and to
be able to perform) various jobs on the shop-floor, from carpenting and
plumbing, for example, to major tool operations and machine repair.
23 Employees' compensation was composed of the two elements - monetary earnings and
benefits in kind. The monetary part included the basic wage and a premium bonus, and
occupied approximately a half of employees' total compensation.
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As characteristic of the post-war time there was a shortage of
supplies from raw materials to spare parts, and workers had to be quite self-
sufficient and inventive rather than narrowly specialized. To learn many
different crafts one had to be fully committed to his job. Many workers
were leaving because of this, and the older workers referred to it in the
interviews as a process of "natural selection". Those who stayed in the
plant completely relied on their masters and trusted them. They believed
that one day they themselves will replace them. Their job was rather well
paid, and there was enough food and rudimentary clothes to buy in the
stores to satisfy their basic needs and requirements, and to fulfill their sense
of a decent life.
Major shifts and changes begin to occur on the shop-floors in the
early 1970s. Up to now, as it was already mentioned, for both younger and
the older generation of workers their work was really a prizvanije . As a
consequence of long indoctrination, they truly believed that by the virtue
of living in the "workers' state," they were the "avant-garde", the
"hegemon," the "backbone" of the Soviet society. All that slowly began to
erode and they felt betrayed (predany). On the shop-floors, masters'
decisions became frequently challenged by younger engineers, the party and
the union leaders, but the most frustrating for the masters was that the
wage differentials among the different groups of workers started to narrow,
and position, experience, etc. were not longer a distinguishing criterion.
When the old masters left, their former apprentices took over, but without
much enthusiasm.
As the enterprise expanded significantly in 1973, so did the demand
for mechanized work. At that time in general, younger people became
very reluctant to search for jobs in the industry. The top managers used all
possible ways to attract them to the enterprise. Most of those who came
and filled low-skilled jobs at the enterprise were limitchiki, or limita,
workers. They came to the city from the rural areas (and more recently
from the Caucasian and other republics), driven not by prizvanije, but
hoping rather to trade their unfavorable working conditions in the plant
for the housing permits (propiska) in the capital city.
Thus, the core workers faced a situation when wage differentials
between them, ITR, and those of the low-skilled maintenance workers
narrowed down. The core workers realized that the Soviet dream,
including a package of "happy life," i.e., a modest apartment, a summer
cottage (dacha), and a car, will always remain for them just a dream.
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Although their salaries were steadily rising, there was not much to buy in
the stores anymore. In the workers' opinion this marked a beginning of
the collapse of the work ethic and the trust they vested in the state. The
state, as workers explained, failed to give them a deeper motivation for
their work and to secure their status and earnings to which they were used
to in the post-war period. A famous joke: "Let Lenin do the work, he is
immortal," became quite popular. Being a worker was no longer perceived
as a privilege, but as fate. This is how a fifty-years old worker described the
"social contract" of the 1970s: "We depended on the state, but the state also
depended on us. Thus, the state pretended it paid us, and we pretended
that we worked."
Young people were not willing any longer to go into vocational
training after the eighth grade, because the institutions, called PTUs,
acquired a bad reputation as "schools for delinquents." At the same time,
not all tenth-grade graduates could have been accepted to Universities, and
had to work at the enterprises. This was the law (employment was still
compulsory and one could have been prosecuted for being unemployed).
Most of these compulsory "new workers" considered their work as
temporary. Men anticipated to be drafted to the Soviet Army, and after the
service they could enter University without entrance exams. Women were
expected to marry and shortly after giving birth move to some other job. If
they did stay at the enterprise, they had to work on the second or third shift
because of the seniority system.
Throughout the 1970s, there were several attempts on the part of
Arsenal's administration to improve working conditions. Thousands of
rubles were spent on the "labor protection." New shop-floors were
decorated with bright colors; music was played there during the working
hours, workers were provided with white robes and access to the recreation
centers, tea rooms, etc. In fact, they were drinking vodka in these tea
rooms (as they told me), and they still continue to drink now.
Along with the changes in wage-determination occurring
throughout the 1970s, the system of "on-the-job training" was also
collapsing. Younger workers did not want to learn from the older ones and
the latter did not want to teach the former. The production process became
extremely wasteful, quality was declining (since some youths, particularly
women, were given low-paid "non-productive" jobs in quality-control
sections), and in addition to the external supply shortages there developed
internal ones, because "new workers" just did not do their work on time.
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In contrast, during the 1950s and the 1960s if some spare parts were
missing, workers were trained to produce them themselves, but already in
the late 1970s in similar situation the production process would have
stopped for hours. At that time more experienced workers began to use the
"lost time" for their own needs to supplement their own incomes by taking
side orders, for example. These were the first signs of expanding informal
(second) economy.
Old masters who were promoted to managerial positions, tried to
use their knowledge of production as best as they could, although today
many of them realize that this knowledge was not enough. Their only
concern was that the production (technological) process was kept going.
Thus, in their view, if there was a shortage of one kind of spare parts, and
an excess of other, it was considered normal, it was familiar to them from
their shop-floor experience. The obvious decision was to exchange (trade)
the excess as soon as possible to keep the production process going (in a way
this was reflected later in the preoccupation with volume production
rather than efficiency).
Arsenal's top managers had special persons, expediters (tolkach),
who had to "push through" needed supplies using barter, personal
(including family connections), and bribery. Because shortages started to be
seen as something natural in all the branches of the economy, top
managers did not have to rely on inputs from their official suppliers (i.e.,
"assigned" to them by the Ministries), but were developing their own
networks usually based on their own as well as expediters' connections.
These informal networks of barter exchange were based on the principles of
reciprocity and trust (doverie). The trust, as an old manager reported, was
built for decades. For example, some of his partners might have been his
friends, "comrades" from the W.W.II with whom he "went all the way
from Moscow in 1942 to Berlin in 1945."
The problem of shortage was solved, however, through these
networks only on the level of spare parts (zapchasti), tools, and some
unique materials. Shortage of raw materials (syr'ye) was too big an issue to
solve through the inter-enterprise barter. Usually it was the responsibility
of the Ministry to deal with this issue, the latter had no other choice
because it had to pay the enterprise before the product was even
produced. 24
24 Therefore, when the command system collapsed in the 1990s, Arsenal had to stop many of
its shop-floors and send workers on unpaid leaves. This hidden unemployment had nothing
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As shortages (particularly of raw materials and energy) accumulated,
and more equipment was standing idle, the response paradoxically was not
to cut employment but to hire more workers. Some workers believe that
this was associated with policies directed towards further increase in the
scale of the enterprise. The state was allocating money that had to be spent
(osvojeny), otherwise these funds had to be cut in the next planning
period. Most of the hired workers were counted as labor safety specialists,
quality controllers, chauffeurs, warehouse keepers, but their parallel jobs
(po sovmestitel'stvu) were in the union, Young Communist League
(Komsomol), or Party organizations. To justify the existence of those
"ballast" people, managers reported work not carried out (pripiski) to the
upper hierarchy, Glavk. Bureaucrats at Glavk were well aware of pripiski,
but have chosen to close their eyes because they did the same when
reporting to the Ministry.
Because of pripiski norms were kept low on the shop-floor level and
the higher norms were technically impossible to achieve because of the
constant shortage uncertainty. To deal with this problem, enterprise
administration began to move workers around alternating their
assignments in a attempt to resolve possible conflicts that could arise
between those more and those less productive ones. This sort of
disassociation of workers from their jobs was possible due to a very
bureaucratized system of wage determination.
A socialist wage scale differentiated workers' wages according to six
parameters: the length of time worked, the level of skills, the region, the
industry, the enterprise, and working conditions. The wage system was the
following: in each industrial branch (otrasl) a base rate (stavka) - the basic
wage of the lowest paid grade was established (most industries had six
grades, or razryad). Then on the basis of a tariff grid (tarifnaya setka) wages
of the higher-grade were calculated as percentages of the lowest-grade rate
with special coefficients for each of the six parameters (the region, the
industry, the enterprise, etc.)
Workers could be moved to higher or lower grade levels, but were
paid according to the skill level of the work they performed. All other
payments (premium bonuses and extra-payments for night work or years
of service) were paid at the skill grade of the worker.25 Thus, a skilled
to do with the initial goal of restructuring through technological and organization
modernization of production.
25 Filtzer, Donald. 1994. Soviet Worker and the Collapse of Perestroika. Cambridge
University Press, p. 65.
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worker assigned to a simple task could overfulfil the norm and surpass the
low skill grade rate, or the low skill worker could be assigned to a higher
grade job falling short its requirement. However, while working in the
lower grade, one was not allowed to overfulfil the norm more than twenty
five percent. This was an informal compromise between the higher and
lower skilled workers and the administration.
The practice of rotating workers brought even more unfairness and
injustice to the shop-floor. Workers less and less trusted each other. Cases
of alcoholism, absenteeism, and the small-scale theft, or "siphoning"
(nesunstvo) became more common. As one worker recounted: "I
considered the day wasted if I had not stolen something, even some bolt
which I did not really need." The worker added that later he was able to
exchange or sell stolen materials (spirits, lenses, powders) and tools.
Initially it was done only out of frustration - workers were buying alcohol
for the money they would receive from these illegal transactions. One
worker said that this was a "special" kind of money which he would
usually spend immediately, and would never report "even to his wife."
A growing alcoholism among the workers contributed not only to
the problem of absenteeism, but also affected the quality of production.
Workers became extremely sensitive to the changes in prices of alcohol and
saw it as a threat. The first step to deal with the issue of alcoholism was
undertaken in 1985 by Gorbachev when came to power. Gorbachev's
infamous anti-alcohol campaign resulted, among others, in destruction of
the well established, famous vineyards in the Crimea and Caucuses (this,
needless to say, did not affect the rate of alcoholism at all). The other
consequence of this anti-alcohol campaign was enormous reduction in tax
revenues. Workers associated it with the beginning of the inflation in the
mid 1980's. "If they want to keep me sober (trezvyi) they have to stand
behind the machine themselves," one worker said, pointing probably to
the money-printing press.
2. 3. Wage Reform of 1986 and Widening of the Wage Differentials
Until the late 1970s, most production workers were paid on a piece-
rate basis. In the mid 1980s, this arrangement began to be replaced by a
brigade system of payment based on the collective piece-rate. Gorbachev's
wage reform in the fall of 1986 attempted to solve the problems of
incentives by widening wage differentials between ITR and manual
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workers. Workers described this reform as a mere reshuffling (utruska)
because many of them were put into the lower skill grades. The
differentials between the skilled and unskilled workers widened from 1:1.5
to 1:1.8. The output quotas were raised together with basic wage rates (up to
forty percent for the high-skilled workers). A share of quality and other
bonuses was increased to account for almost half of the monetary
compensation.
Workers' earnings were tied up to the production results of their
brigade with each worker's wage estimated on the basis of KTU (coefficient
of labor participation). The formula, however, was so complicated that
neither workers nor managers were able to understand it. Even
accountants could barely work with it. As a senior accountant reported in
the interview, each month she had to consult with the local committee on
wages to do the calculations in a right way.
Gorbachev's reforms only exacerbated inequalities which
accumulated on Arsenal over the years. Firmly established supply
networks represented a significant obstacle for the introduction of new
technology, and that could have caused in turn disruptions into the
routine patterns of production. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s
high-skilled workers who remained in Arsenal were no longer performing
the tasks specified in their job descriptions. Progressively they became
engaged in planning and monitoring activities and formed part of the
enterprise's bureaucracy. Equipment they serviced in the 1970s was taken
over by the low-skilled workers, and the new one was not installed,
because this required new supplies and subsequently creation of the new
networks.
A new generation of the top managers, as workers pointed out, was
unable to build these networks. Top managers who came to Arsenal in
early 1980s were appointed by the state, and they had to prove their loyalty
to the Ministry that "employed" them. They had a different career paths
than the top managers of the 1970s. 26 To put it bluntly, they were
administrators from ideology with a vague idea about supply bottlenecks,
and little concerns about productivity on a shop-floor level. They were
more interested in securing steady increases in productivity of the
enterprise as a whole through further centralization of the decision-
26 Core workers' had less and less chances for upward mobility, for example, of moving into
management positions as in the early 70s. Occupations such as human resources, finance, and
accounting as opposed to those in production became viwed as more appropriate backgrounds
for management.
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making process. The vertical integration of Arsenal in the 1980s was
achieved via unions, Komsomol, and Party organizations.
The workers, however, were quite skeptical about the slogans of
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (freedom of expression) propagated
by these organizations. It might have been partially related to the fact that
Gorbachev's renewal (obnovlenije) came together with his unpopular anti-
alcohol campaign and almost five-fold increase in prices of wine27 and
vodka. As problems of labor and the Soviet economy in general
multiplied, managers of Arsenal and other large enterprises demanded the
introduction of a wage reform.
Several scholars have argued that the last blow to the collapsing
Soviet economic system was the 1986 wage reform, the third Soviet wage
reform in the postwar years. Its major goal was to increase productivity
through a new incentives structure. As a part of reform, for the first time
since industrialization in the 1930s, wage-determination was partially
decentralized, and the decision-making upon the monetary compensation
moved from the Ministries to the enterprise-level. Wage differentials
have been widened, a significant departure from the two previous reforms
which tended to reduce differentials. The decile ratio of earnings of
industrial wage earners fell from 3.36 in 1956 (after the first postwar reform
was introduced) to 2.63 in 1972, when the second wage reform had been
completed. 28
Basic wage rates of wage earners were raised on the average by thirty
percent, with the larger increases for more skilled employees. Basic salary
rates of managerial and engineering-technical personnel were raised by
average thirty percent, with especially high increases for designers and
process engineers, directly involved in R&D. Grade 1 rates were related to
the minimum wage, raised to eighty rubles per month compared to
seventy rubles in 1975 and forty rubles in 1962. For the first time, higher
wages were given to workers engaged in creating new techniques or
mastering a new technology, including machine tool makers, machine
operators, etc.
Substantial wage increases were given to the managerial and
engineering-technical personnel, whose earnings exceeded those of wage
earners by almost seventy percent in the mid-1950s, but since then, by the
27 Price increases were directly related to the sharp fall in the supply of alochol due to the
destruction of the wineyards.
28 Chapman, Janet. 1988. "Gorbachev's Wage Reform." Soviet Economy 4: 339.
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mid-1980s equalized with the latter. For the first time, managers and ITR
were differentiated into "managerial staff" and "specialists," to reflect
changes in promotion procedures and on job ladders. The "specialists," in
turn, were differentiated into "designers," "technologists," and "scientists."
Also a new, separate category of "quality controllers" was introduced.
Formerly, there was a single job ladder, i.e., an engineer could have
been promoted from ordinary engineer to senior engineer, but after that
the only possible advancement was to an administrative position. Now
there were four categories of engineers instead of two.29
Salaries of managers were built up from a salary of foreman, and the
salary of the latter was built up from the Grade 6 wage, which in turn was
determined from the Grade 1 wage, and ultimately related to the
minimum wage (see Table 1).
Table 1. Minimum Wage and Salaries of Managers and Engineers
in Machinery Industry, 1975 and 1988, rubles.
1975 1988
Occupation
Minimum wage 70 80
Grade 1 wage 95 105
Grade 6 wage 124 157
Foreman 155 220
Engineer, beginning 115 140
Engineer, top rate 165 230
Director (manager) 300-330 400
The 1986 wage decree called for two normative methods of wage
formation and distribution of "cost-accounting income." Under the first
method the wage fund was determined according to the norms of output
and productivity calculated by a ministry. Payments to the budget were
made from profits, and on the basis of ministry-set normative applied to
profit, the residual profit retained by enterprise was divided into the
production development fund, the social development fund, and the
bonus fund. The four funds constituted the enterprise's "cost-accounting
income."
29 In the machinery industry, the old system provided for "engineers (with a salary range of
115-150 rubles per month) and for "senior engineers (with a range of 140-180 rubles). The new
scheme set the salary for "engineers" at 140-180 rubles, for "engineers of category II" at 160-
200, for "engineers of category I" at 180-220, and for "leading engineers" at 190-230 rubles.
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Under the second, "more progressive" method, payments to the
budget were made from net revenue (gross revenues less material costs
other than wages) leaving the enterprise's cost-accounting income. The
residual (ostatok) along with the normative payments to the production
development fund and social development fund, formed the wage and
material incentive (pooschrenije) funds.
In the first two years of the reform, enterprises began to put their
individual units (plants, shop-floors, and even individual brigades) on
self-financing. This was done through the introduction of internal
subcontracting (podryad), when the units were contracting essentially with
the top management. Responsibilities of the latter included the provision
of necessary supplies, the distribution of the products, and financial
decision-making (the setting up of the units' budgets and wage-funds).
Leasing arrangements (arenda) introduced in the 1990s, shifted the
three functions (previously executed by the top management) to the unit
level, but this still has not resolved problems of productivity and the work
ethic. Leasing payments (and after 1991 - taxes) were set up so high that
they almost equaled the old mandatory payments to the budget (part of
which was used to subsidize less efficient enterprises).
The 1986 wage reform was designed on the assumption that the
partial differentiation and decentralization of wages would increase
productivity and improve work ethic. The assumption proved to be
wrong. As it turned out, workers could not increase productivity even if
they worked really hard because equipment in some units was, perhaps, as
old as workers themselves. A new equipment was standing idle in the
enterprise's warehouses for reasons that were discussed earlier.
Summary
The post-war period was a "golden age" for the Soviet industry and
the workers. In the early 1970s, to remain competitive in the sphere of
space exploration, and to speed up innovation, the state reformed the
industry by amalgamating territorially scattered plants into scientific-
production associations. The rapid growth of the associations created a
shortage of labor in the cities, and the top managers had to attract low-
skilled labor from the rural areas in exchange for housing permits and
higher wages.
Wage-leveling among the core workers, engineering and technical
personnel and auxiliary workers was a major source of frustration and
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unhappiness on the part of the core workers. Their compensation
(monetary and non-monetary), social status, and vocation, were
undermined. Subsequent spread of alcoholism, absenteeism and turnover,
have slow down productivity from about six percent annual increase in
1971-75 to about two percent in 1981-85. The reluctance of the top managers
to introduce new technology and equipment also contributed to the
productivity slowdown.
Gorbachev's perestroika, which started with an anti-alcohol
campaign, brought even more frustration to the core workers. The 1986
reform tried to solve the problem of low productivity and working
discipline by widening wage differentials and gradually decentralizing the
system of wage determination. The state, however, has continued to
control wages through a rigid system of tariffs with wage ceilings for
different job categories. Wages were build up from the minimum wage,
and were more the attributes of jobs rather than employees who held
them.
In the 1980s, a new generation of the top managers came to Arsenal
with bureaucratic (apparatnyj) rather than technical background. They had
to exercise loyalty to the state who "employed" (appointed) them. They
saw themselves as executives of perestroika at the enterprise, and were
quite enthusiastic about the new mechanisms of cost-accounting and wage
determination introduced in the late 1980s.
With the overall economic decentralization, the state started to view
problems of the 1980s (alcoholism, absenteeism, turnover, recruiting, and
conflicts over retirement) as Arsenal's "internal" problems. In reality,
these "internal" problems were consequences of the macro-economic
management of the early 1970s.
As the state delegated more economic authority to the managers in
solving labor problems, it also demanded from them "new thinking"
(novoje myshlenije), a term coined by Gorbachev himself. With the
eroding ideological base of the Soviet society, the state delegated part of its
authority to the top managers. As a result of this, a new form of
paternalism have developed within the enterprise. Managerial
paternalism was more personalized than that of the Communist Party, and
served economic rather than political functions.
In 1991, after Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet
Union, Arsenal's broke up with its supervising ministries in Moscow.
The Ukrainian government liberalized trade, and the Ukrainian
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monopolies, including Arsenal, have significantly increased prices for their
products. This resulted in more than 10,000 percent inflation in 1993 alone.
The real wages fell by half of the 1987 level. However, despite the macro-
economic crisis, less than one percent of unemployment was registered by
the official statistics. There was no major lay-offs in Arsenal despite a
sharp decrease in the levels of output. This time the top managers seem to
struggle with labor shortage rather than with over-employment.
Although the National Bank continues to subsidize wages, many
employees (especially the younger generation) have left Arsenal to seek
jobs in commerce and services. The rest of the employees, now less
dependent on the state and increasingly dependent on the top managers
(who lobby wages in the parliament), began to rely more on the individual
rather than collective bargaining in addressing their numerous problems.
Now, after their experiences in the 1970s and the 1980s, workers almost
totally distrust the state and the communist unions, and turn to the top
managers as the only "protectors" from hardships of the emerging market.
The top managers are capitalizing on the workers' dependence.
Their deals include selling of Arsenal's new equipment (previously staying
idle because of the supply and labor shortages), renting of the office space
(central location of the enterprise becomes quite important here). The
managers also register small commercial structures (Arsenal's "pockets"),
which buy raw materials from the enterprise, and then sell it on
commodity exchanges, or directly on the foreign markets. Creation of the
"pocket" structures is achieved through a "double accounting," and this
later becomes one of the reasons why these new structures can not attract
foreign investors to start the production.3 0
Workers are well aware of these transactions, but they perceive them
as part of the enterprise's reform. Today, it is more important for them to
receive their wages, although they receive them now only once in two
months. The managers also allow more skilled workers to take orders "on
the side" to supplement their incomes, while former limitchiki are given
the opportunity to use part of their working time in the villages.
These informal arrangements allow the workers to preserve their
current employment status and to "survive" the official wages. Such
dualism could be viewed as a temporary socio-economic compromise
between the state, the top managers, and the workers, perhaps inevitable
30 The latter as a rule require audit reports. Top managers are usually against such
"interventions" as an interview with an audit company in Kiev evidenced.
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under the transition from one form of ownership to another. The problem
with these arrangements is that their economic and social costs can be too
high in the long run. As it is going to be discussed in the next chapter, both
older workers' and managers' incentives under the transition are directed
towards a short-term survival rather than growth and development.
Arsenal as an entity survives today largely due to the subsidies from
the state. However, such policy will continue only until the enterprise is
privatized. Arsenal's employees, however, are very skeptical of
privatization. In their view, the major problem of the enterprise lies not
in the form of ownership, but in the specialization. The employees stress
that since 1991, i.e., after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the enterprise as
a whole lost its purpose, because only the products of certain units are
demanded by the market.
3. Employees' Incentives Under the Transition
. it is worth stressing that unemployment
in the (defense) sector, given the high skill
level of its employees, involves huge
opportunity costs, while the chances for
mass redundancy and political dislocation
are enormous.
Alice Amsden 31
After the interviews with the employees it became evident that
there are four major actors in Arsenal's privatization: high-skilled workers
(represented mostly by second and third-generation urban residents), low-
skilled workers (mostly first-generation urban residents), the middle
managers, and the top managers. Each of these groups has a different set of
incentives, important for understanding of a possible interplay between the
actors during Arsenal's privatization.
3. 1. Top Managers
As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, until the 1970s
Arsenal's labor shortages were caused mainly by demographic and other
factors, "external" to the enterprise (policies of the state regarding the
31 Amsden, Alice and Jacek Kochanowicz, Lance Taylor. 1994. The Market Meets Its
Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, p. 10.
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expansion of Arsenal, for example). Finding a solution to these problems
was up to the state and the Communist Party.32
In the 1980s, when the enterprise was not longer expanding at the
typical rate of the 1970s, Arsenal had to deal more and more with
"internal" shortages caused by increasing labor turnover and absenteeism
(monthly and seasonal), recruitment, and employment conflicts. Finding a
solution to these "internal" problems was delegated by the state to the top
managers. Such delegation of decision-making power also marked a
transition from paternalism of the Communist Party (more than thirty
percent of Arsenal's employees were its members) to paternalism of the top
managers. Thus, managerial paternalism in my view, had three
interrelated sources. The first was related to the labor discipline, the second
to the labor shortage, and the third to the absence of the detailed
employment contracts.
First, because the state continued to allocate funds for the enterprise
despite its performance, the top managers chose to close to ignore problems
of alcoholism and absenteeism. Wages used to be paid twice a month -
usually around the fifth (eighty percent of the monthly salary) and the
twentieth of the month. The daily records show that attendance fell
sharply between fifth and ninth of the month, then increased until
twentieth, and fell again between the twentieth and twenty fourth of the
month. An identical case of absenteeism was analyzed in the context of a
Japanese enterprise:
the fact that work on the twentieth day of the month was paid
for fifteen days later, while work on the twenty-first was paid
for thirty more days later, made the psychological cost of work
on the twenty-first day much higher than that of work on the
twentieth day.33
In case of Arsenal, absenteeism was closely related to alcoholism,
and the registered cases of which coincided with days of the wage
payments.
Seasonal absenteeism and the subsequent turnover had different
roots. It was rather related to the fact that most of auxiliary workers who
were hired as limitchiki who preserved their ties with relatives in the
villages and were able in a way to continue their former life style. As their
living standard began to decline, they spent more and more time in the
32 The Party congresses developed the five-year guidelines of macro- and micro-
economic development.
33 Tajra, Koji. 1970. Economic Development and Labor Market in Japan. Columbia
University Press, p. 120.
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villages, particularly in the spring and the fall to farm the land. In fact, in
the last three years of transition farming for this category of workers
became more important than their work at the enterprise.
Secondly, recruitment was becoming more and more difficult. In
the 1980s the top managers had to face not only a shortage of low-skilled
labor (as they did in the 1970s), but also a shortage of young specialists to fill
junior engineering positions. In the first case, the top managers were
unable to attract workers from the rural areas as easily as before, because of
shortages of housing in Kiev (which in the 1980s already became acute).
Thus, the top managers were forced to hire work force from the city itself.
Main incentives for urban workers were higher wages and a quick
membership in the Communist Party. Thus, wage differentials between
the high-skilled and low-skilled workers began to narrow down again,
despite the provision of the 1986 reform.
In the second case, young specialists were leaving the enterprises
after the three-year mandatory assignment (raspredelenije) after their
graduation, since human resources managers were reluctant to hire them
preferring more "loyal," older candidates to prevent the turnover.
Third, there was no detailed employment contracts in Arsenal.
A hired worker had to fill a brief form basically "agreeing" to work at the
enterprise. Increasing employment conflicts (especially about retirement
provisions) were usually resolved informally.
Today, when the macro-economic reforms and especially the
liberalization of prices "went too far," as one top manager put it, this group
develops incentives which are not just political as before, but more and
more economic. For the first time they can call themselves "managers,"
and "businessmen," borrowing both words from English.34 Most of them
hold parallel positions in the private firms or banks in addition to their
formal jobs.
The top managers occupy a position of middlemen between the
employees and the state and their incentives are twofold. On one hand,
they try to use employees' dependence on the management and keep them
at the enterprise. For the managers retaining the workers is strategically
important since support of the latter is crucial for them in gaining control
over the enterprise during its privatization. On the other hand, the top
managers themselves continue to be dependent on the state. But the state
34 A partial explanation for this borrowing is that the Ukrainian word pidpryjemets' or
the Russian word predprinimatel' had a negative ideological connotation in the past.
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in turn, is also dependent on them. Although the budget constraint has
"hardened," the state still heavily subsidizes Arsenal, especially the wages.
The fear of unemployment is reflected in the present-day policy responses
that are automatic rather than active 35 and soaring inflation is the best
evidence of this. Because of enterprises' monopolism and inter-enterprise
financial indebtedness, the top managers can easily decide not to return the
credits to the state, and eventually establish a powerful lobby in the
parliament.
3.2. Middle Managers
Professionally, the group is largely represented by the people with
technical, particularly engineering background. Most of them were
promoted to their current positions from the high-skilled jobs they once
occupied. This group's orientation is also twofold. On one hand, middle
managers are subordinated to their "bosses," i.e., top managers. On the
other, they socialize (and identify themselves) more with the high-skilled
workers from their units.
Middle managers view the lack of incentives as a major reason for
the virtual collapse of production in Arsenal. A manager of a defense-
related unit was especially bitter about it: "we could produce mirrors for the
motor vehicles, but we were ordered to stay where we are. As a unit
manager I have very little power to change anything - all major decisions
are being made on the top. Thus, my workers are being paid according to
what they produce, meaning nothing."
From the middle managers' perspective, privatization of Arsenal
will hardly change the situation. One of the managers, a forty-years old
man with a degree in electric engineering, was quite disappointed with the
current privatization scheme. He manages a unit which produces
consumer cameras. The products are in high demand, but the unit does
not benefit from this, because it does not have strategic planning and
accounting of its own, and as a consequence does not control the profits it
makes.
When I asked him about the logic behind Arsenal's privatization, he
took from his table a book by Lewis Carroll "Through the Looking-Glass"
and read from it: "You don't know how to manage Looking-Glass cakes,
35 From interviews at the round-table discussions organized jointly by the Ukrainian
Government and the World Bank mission in Ukraine.
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the Unicorn remarked. Hand it round first, and cut it afterwards." The
manager noted that the current privatization scheme attempts exactly to do
the same with Arsenal : to hand the enterprise' property, and only then to
cut it. "This does not make any sense from either political, or economic
point of view, he continued, because it would be much easier to privatize
my unit, and find investors for it, if it was cut off from Arsenal first. But
the top management will never go for it, they still live according to the
Soviet absurd thinking."
Other middle managers also believe that among the reasons for
Arsenal's poor performance is an inability of their individual units to plan
their own production. Some of them point out that partially planned and
partially spontaneous decentralization of decision-making, which started
in the late 1980's, provided power only to Arsenal's top managers. At the
same time, the decision-making on the level of individual units was not
liberalized at all.
Some older middle managers who began as workers in the 1970s and
witnessed the industrial reform of 1973, think that the present day
situation in Arsenal echoes problems such as barriers to innovation and
productivity which the state tried to resolve through the reform. This
time, however, these barriers can be removed by returning the units to
their pre-1970s state.
3. 3. High-Skilled Workers
The high-skilled workers identify themselves with their labor
collective and treasure its craft traditions from the earlier era. However,
they have very few opportunities to transfer their skills to a younger
generation, since most of the younger workers left the enterprise after 1991.
Today, these workers' major incentive is to preserve their labor collective
by all possible means, for the reason they view it as their second family and
a source of moral support.
These workers defend their Soviet values and tastes, and on the one
hand blame Gorbachev, and Ukrainian "nationalists" on the other, for
destroying the Soviet Union. They speak Russian and by that identify
themselves consciously with the Soviet culture, they view Ukrainian
independence as a "political spectacle directed by the "nationalist" forces
with the support of the West." The whole idea of transition is also unclear
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to them. As one of the workers put it, "Transition to where, and what
for?"
Thus, the workers see their mounting problems as a consequence of
Ukraine's independence. As of now, no one explained to them what are
the real advantages of Ukraine's and Arsenal's independence from
Moscow, and what are the goals and future benefits of privatization.
Workers fear their possible unemployment and early retirement, because
there is no formal or informal safety net for them outside of Arsenal.
Many of them continue to live close to the center of Kiev, where the costs
of living are rising rapidly. At the same time, they cannot move to the
periphery because of the continuing shortage of housing and the
bureaucratic complexities associated with exchanging or selling apartments.
From the beginning of the century until 1991, the workers' families
spent about half of their incomes on food, but in the last two years,
according to the interviews, food takes away almost eighty percent of their
income. Workers try to supplement their official wages by taking side
orders or occasionally exchanging spare parts and materials for other goods,
or simply selling them. One worker even asked me during an interview,
"what is the difference between a free market (rynok) and a flea market
(tolchok)?" With a sharp decrease in the real wages (see Appendix 2),
workers' total earnings might just be barely sufficient to keep them alive.
For those workers who live in the enterprise's dormitories, the
situation is even more frustrating. A letter of thirteen Arsenal's workers to
the editors of the newspaper News from Ukraine can illustrate their living
conditions and point to the true nature of the social benefits system at
Arsenal (see Appendix 3).
With respect to the working conditions, the situation does not look
much better. Workers long time ago stopped complaining about constant
violations of the safety norms. It is clear from the interviews that the
enterprise administration does not seem to care about workplace safety
when even more severe violations such as Chernobyl do not evoke any
preventive measures on the part of the state.
When asked why do they stay at the enterprise if both living and
working conditions are so unbearable, workers said that they are patient,
and believe that the state will eventually take care of their problems.
When I insisted and asked what happens if the state will not help them,
they could not quite understand the question. "The state should care about
us as parents should care about their children," one worker responded.
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The state for many workers is represented by the top management of the
enterprise. The decisions of the top management essentially establish a
norm to such practices as side orders (payments) and use of equipment and
materials for private purposes.
3.4. Low-Skilled Workers
Low-skilled workers are represented mostly by the first-generation
urban residents, or limita. These workers preserve strong ties with their
families, relatives, and friends in the rural areas. There, they spend all of
their leisure time and about quarter of their official working time. Their
links with the village are not only economic, but also social.
Most of the low-skilled workers live on the peripheries of Kiev, and
these can hardly give the residents any sense of community or security
because of the street design with the uniform housing projects and absence
of cultural or social life. Many low-skilled workers speak surzhik, a form
of language which is neither Ukrainian, nor Russian, a lexical mixture of
both.
Low-skilled workers don't have a strong identification with a labor
collective as high-skilled workers have. Former limitchiki stay at their job
only because it gives them an opportunity to have an additional source of
income. It is important to note that limitchiki are often mentioned by the
state planners as a major potential source of unemployment. However,
considering that since 1991, the workers supplemented their official wages
with the informal activities in the villages, the state planners perspective
could be fundamentally flawed:
Where people who lack wage jobs are, over long periods,
sustaining themselves through "informal" income earning
arrangements, and where the typical low-income wage earner
may also be supplementing his earnings by a variety of other
activities, the whole unemployment issue ... loses its salience.
Instead, the question of poverty and income levels in general
becomes more relevant than the definition of
underemployment.36
Low-skilled workers support the top managers because the latter
allow their mobility between the city and the village. In contrast to the
high-skilled workers, this group seems to adjust more easily to the severe
36 Peattie, Lisa. 1987. "An Idea in Good Currnecy and How It Grew: the Informal Sector."
World Development 15 (7): 852.
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conditions of the transition period. Low-skilled workers do not have
much solidarity with the high-skilled workers. The latter envy these
"peasant-workers" their external sources of support, disrespecting them in
the same time for lack of skills and ability to perform high-quality work.
Summary
Individual adjustment strategies of the four major groups of
Arsenal's employees emerge as a spontaneous response to the collapse of
the Soviet-type incentives and governance structure at the enterprise.
Everyday actions of Arsenal's top managers and the employees could be
interpreted as attempts to survive the transition by establishing and
maintaining dual "affiliative ties" to use Stark's (1986) term. Top
managers and low-skilled workers seem to have these ties both within and
outside the enterprise, while middle managers and high-skilled workers
have these ties only within the enterprise.
Top managers are maneuvering between the state and the
employees to preserve their positions until privatization will make them
legitimate owners of the enterprise. They usually hold parallel jobs in the
commercial structures or banks. Middle managers are maneuvering
between the top managers and the high-skilled workers. Some of them
also hold parallel jobs, but the majority does not have a permanent second
source of income.
High-skilled workers keep the attachment to their jobs and the labor
collective, despite substandard working and living conditions, and only
occasionally supplement their incomes by taking side orders. Low-skilled
workers, although not attached to their jobs, are forced to combine them
with work in the villages.
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4. Reasons for Arsenal's Fragmentation
...Macroeconomic stabilization need not be
the precondition for, and may indeed be a
result of reorganization of productive
assets.
Charles Sabel and Jane Prokop37
Arsenal's production has decreased by almost half over the last three
years. At the same time, there has not been any lay-offs or significant
attempts to re-organize production on the part of the top managers. On
one hand, the present-day labor-management relations are characterized by
ambiguity in both employment and property arrangements at the
enterprise. On the other hand, there is an extreme dependence of workers
on the top managers. Under such circumstances, the latter might acquire
unprecedented powers in the course of Arsenal's privatization.
The issues of employment and wages are in the center of the top
managers' bargaining with the state and the workers over the distribution
of Arsenal's shares. Although the workers formally remain state
employees, decisions upon these issues are now made by the top managers.
Workers do not have much bargaining power of their own, since the old
Soviet-type unions are now under the management's control:
The collapse of the Party has driven the union even more
firmly into the arms of management because the union no
longer has any higher authority to which to appeal. The
union is unable to appeal to its members for support because
in their eyes it is simply an arm of administration. The
official unions are so discredited that most workers do not see
any need for a union at all.38
Moreover, the management is also opposing the penetration of the
Free Trade Unions (Nezalezhni Profspilky) on Arsenal, arguing that the
union organization already exists there. 39
Under the current privatization scheme, Arsenal's ownership has to
be divided among the state, the top managers, the employees, and the
37 Sabel, Charles and Jane Prokop. 1994. Stabilization Through Reorganization? Some
Preliminary Implications of Russia's Entry Into World Markets in the Age of Discursive
Quality Standards. Paper presented at the World Bank conference "Corporate Governance
in Central Europe and Russia." Transition Economics Division, p. 27.
38 Clarke, Simon and Peter Fairbrother. "After the Coup: the Workers' Movement in the
Transition to a Market Economy." In What About the Workers? by Michael Burawoy, Simon
Clarke, Peter Fairbrother and Pavel Krotov. London: Verso, p. 194.
39 From an interview at the Kiev office of the Free Trade Unions Institute (USA).
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public (the "outside" investors) in such a way that neither group would
have the absolute control over the enterprise, that is more than half of its
shares. However, if the employees trade their shares to the top managers
(at least they plan to do this, according to the interviews), then the latter
would be able to get such a control. Today this control over the state-
owned Arsenal is established informally.
According to the existing legislation, a foreign partner who
establishes a joint-venture with one of Arsenal's units, formally establishes
a joint-venture with Arsenal itself. It turns out that even when property
in a joint-venture with Arsenal's unit is divided half-and-half, the
ultimate control over it remains in the hands of Arsenal's top managers.
For example, as early as 1991, one of the civilian units (shop-floor of
about fifty workers) established a joint venture with a Polish firm to
produce medical equipment. About forty percent of shares were held by
the Polish partner, another forty percent were held by Arsenal's top
managers, and twenty percent were held by employees of the venture (i.e.
workers and middle managers). However, wages of the venture's
employees are only slightly higher than wages of workers in other units.
In addition, when the enterprise experiences electricity or fuel shortages,
the joint venture's workers stay idle as well.
With changing relative prices, civilian production units could have
better prospects in terms of profits in comparison to their defense-related
counterparts. However, they cannot fully use opportunities of the opening
market to their benefit. Although spontaneous decentralization of the
enterprise, (which followed the collapse of its supervising hierarchy in
Moscow) gave more autonomy to its individual units, defense-related
units are still subsidized from the profits of the civilian ones. As a result,
wages of the high-skilled workers across the units remain equally low.
Within the units, core productive workers with high flexible skills
could earn higher wages as compared to auxiliary low-skilled workers.
However, the dependence of both core and auxiliary workers on the top
managers, workers' deep distrust of each other and of the state, and
subsequent deterioration of the old unions, make employees' bargaining
with the top managers more and more informal. As a result, neither high-
skilled, nor low-skilled workers are laid-off.
All these dependencies in my view, contribute significantly to
Arsenal's dysfunctioning. They are inherited in part from the old regime,
and are cultivated by the top managers. One of the strategies to overcome
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these pathological dependencies 40 is to divide the enterprise into smaller
units, or, in other words, to fragment it.
If privatization will occur before fragmentation, Arsenal as an entity
is likely to remain formally under the control of its labor collective and
informally - under the control of its top managers. In fact, the "insider"
ownership becomes possible because of an informal agreement between the
top managers and the employees established prior to privatization. The
"insider" control over the enterprise will hardly create incentives for
increasing productivity and innovation, because top managers primary
goal is to preserve the status quo. Top managers will continue to demand
subsidies from the state to pay its workers subsistence-level wages .
The fragmentation is likely to be supported by the high-skilled
workers and managers of the civilian units. Today their wages are only
slightly higher than wages of workers and managers of the defense-related
units. However, high-skilled workers and managers in both types of units
feel that they could earn more if their units became fully autonomous. At
present, they do not have any incentives to increase productivity because
the wages of the low-skilled workers are not that much different from
theirs. Besides, they do not have parallel sources of income as the low-
skilled workers or the top managers.
Managers and the high-skilled workers in the defense-related units
also believe that if their units become fully autonomous, they would be
able to start subcontracting from the small and medium-scale firms. Today
such subcontracting is virtually impossible because the top managers
require to fulfill contracts with their old clients - other large-scale
enterprises, which are usually as inefficient as Arsenal.
The fragmentation is likely to be opposed by the top management
and the low-skilled workers. Both groups hold permanent second jobs
outside the enterprise: the top managers in the private firms or banks, the
low-skilled workers are self-employed in the villages. Thus, the state will
have to deal with the issue of unemployment of auxiliary workers. This
may require for example, job creation programs in the rural areas, or in the
peripheries of Kiev, where most of these workers reside.
40 See Yudanov (1995).
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Conclusion
Changes that occur in Ukraine do not follow advice and expectations
of the Western observers. In the present transitional stage, customs of the
bureaucratized economy are being modified to match the principles of the
market. The case of Arsenal clearly shows that attempts of some actors to
retain the status quo within the enterprise come into conflict with realities
of liberalizing economy, and particularly with the need for a new
incentives structure.
A rationale behind today's large-scale privatization program is to
make enterprises more competitive, and its employees - more productive.
However, in the case of Arsenal, a potential for competitiveness and
higher productivity exists only on the level of individual units. The
engineers of the current privatization scheme do not realize that the
creation of a new incentive structure at Arsenal might be blocked by its old
governance structure. Unless the re-organization of the enterprise occurs
first, its privatization may not bring a desired efficiency.
Thus, the major policy implication of the thesis is that the state
should divide Arsenal into smaller units before planning its privatization.
Such fragmentation in my mind, will create new incentives for Arsenal's
high-skilled workers and the middle managers, and will eliminate
informal incentives of the top managers and the low-skilled workers. As
Stiglitz (1994) points out,
There are good reasons for postponing the privatization issue.
Issues of property rights assignment are highly contentious.
There is no easy solution to how you divide a pie fairly. This
is particularly true when there are lingering questions about
historical property rights. When the pie is growing rapidly,
distribution issues become less contentious. People are
(relatively) content, since they are getting a bigger piece than
they ever anticipated having. However, with the imminent
threat of spontaneous privatization, the issue may be not so
much when to privatize but how, and who should control the
process.41
The case of Arsenal shows that "spontaneous" privatization occurs
when the state merely follows rather than initiates changes in the
governance mechanism of the enterprise. This has especially important
implications for the incentives structure, because such forms of
spontaneous changes in property rights as "assets stripping" by the top
41 Stiglitz, Joseph. 1994. Whither Socialism? Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 263.
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managers, may have adverse consequences for distribution of wealth and
long-term economic competitiveness.
In a system where historically political decision-making has always
dominated economic decision-making, and where collective responsibility
was always more important than the individual responsibility, the
incentives structure of a firm can be very different from that in the West.
At the same time, it would also differ from the structure of incentives
characteristic for Asian-type firms, because the concept of individual
achievement in the Soviet enterprises has developed under different
historical and ideological circumstances as such concept in Japan, for
example. For that reason, although both paternalism and familialism
could be found in a post-Soviet enterprise, they perform different functions
than in a Japanese firm.
The incentive system of a Soviet enterprise combines the elements
of the incentive structures found in both Western and Asian firms. In the
1920s, the Soviet enterprise have adopted (with Lenin's approval) Taylor's
system of scientific management. At the same time, through its system of
vocational and on-the-job training it also tried to cultivate the traditions of
apprenticeship and craftsmanship, characteristic for the Japanese firms.
My argument about the fragmentation developed in an attempt to
solve the first of the three principal-agency problems in the post-Soviet
enterprises, which were discussed in detail by Kornai (1991) and Roemer
(1993): (1) managers-workers relationship, (2) planners-managers
relationship, and (3) workers-planners relationship. None of these
problems was taken into account by authors of the large-scale privatization
program in Ukraine.
The program's explicit assumption is that the macro-economic
stabilization should provide the basis for the micro-economic
restructuring, and that it will be easier to declare enterprises bankrupt after
they are privatized.42 Such an assumption, however, may not be true in
the economy where wages of the majority of employees are set internally
by the large-scale enterprise such as Arsenal. To rephrase Doeringer and
Piore (1971), competitive labor markets will replace the "internal" labor
markets in the post-socialist economies only when the costs of adopting
competitive labor market structure will be less than the costs of hiring and
42 Amsden, Alice and Jacek Kochanowicz, Lance Taylor. 1994. The Market Meets Its
Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, pp. 12-14.
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organizing labor according to the internal labor markets model.43 The
fragmentation may help to reduce these costs.
It is not the large scale of Arsenal that becomes a problem under the
transition, but rather the idiosyncratic structure and the lack of
accountability of its individual units.44 Arsenal's civilian units are
organizationally merged with defense-related units, and this leads to a
situation when defense-related production is subsidized from the profits of
civilian units. With the development of the market, changes in relative
prices put high-skilled workers and unit managers in less and less
favorable conditions. Their major incentive are wages, which today are
not much higher than those of the low-skilled workers. The latter,
however, have an opportunity to supplement their wages by work in the
villages.
The fragmentation will help to break the informal incentives in the
form of parallel employment arrangements, and with them - a vicious
circle of hidden unemployment. Both high-skilled and low-skilled
workers have little incentives to increase productivity when the top
managers guarantee their employment. Besides, they are not interested in
the long-term performance of the enterprise because the time horizon "is
limited to the period of work at the enterprise,"45 and many workers are
close to their retirement. Thus, "insider" ownership and control of
Arsenal will hardly help to revitalize production and to create incentives
for higher productivity and innovation.
Some of the firms that will emerge as a result of the fragmentation
are likely to go bankrupt, but some have good chances not only to survive,
but also to grow. In contrast to the top managers of the Soviet-type
enterprises, managers of these smaller firms are more likely to pursue
strategies of "intensive" rather than "extensive" growth. Their high-
skilled workers will be able to preserve and develop their flexible skills.
Smaller firms are also likely to attract younger workers, because they would
provide a set of incentives qualitatively different from those presently
offered at Arsenal.
43 See Stark (1986).
44 Kuznetsov, Yevgenij. 1994. "Adjustment of Russian Defense-Related Enterprises in 1992-
94: Macroeconomic Implications." Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 6 (4):
473.
45 Weisskopf, Thomas. 1993. "A Democratic Enterprise-Based Market Socialism." In
Market Socialism. The Current Debate ed. by Pranab Bardhan and John Roemer. Oxford
Univeristy Press, p. 132.
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The fragmentation will help the workers to return to the tradition of
craftsmanship (kustarnytstvo). Craft production existed at the enterprise
already at the beginning of the century, and at that time Arsenal 's products
competed successfully with those of prominent German and Italian firms.
Some of the managers of defense-related units, now in much less favorable
situation that those involved in the civilian production, also envision the
development of sub-contracting relationship between the two types of
firms (i.e., those created on the basis of defense-related and civilian units).
Another advantage of the fragmentation is that objects of Arsenal's
social infrastructure (i.e., dormitories, polyclinics, recreation facilities, etc.),
which are now used by the top management as sources of personal
enrichment, could become a common ownership of the newly established
private firms and the communities where the latter are located.
The fragmentation could also lead to the emergence of new unions,
whose functions would be different from those of the old communist ones.
As one worker said, he would like to see unions as institutions which "not
only bargain for wages and organize Labor Day parades,46 but also provide
its members with high-quality training and information about the job
opportunities in Ukraine and abroad." Similar views were expressed by
some students of workers' problems under transition:
Many people look to Japanese enterprise unionism as a model
for the future of the unions, on the basis of the superficial
similarity of the Soviet industrial enterprise and the Japanese
corporation. However, while this is a possible future
development, it would be wrong to see ... unions as enterprise
unions, because although they are in the pocket of the
administration, they do not perform any of the functions
normally identified as lying at the heart of trade unionism,
and so are unable to perform the mediating role expected of a
union, even on management's terms.4 7
Although the fragmentation of Arsenal seems desirable from the
high-skilled workers' and mid-managers' perspective, the state, the top
managers, the low-skilled workers, and the old Soviet-type unions are
likely to oppose it. The fragmentation is not even considered in the
Ukrainian privatization program. Its architects, advised by Price
Waterhouse, rejected the proposal of fragmentation (put forward by some
middle managers) as politically unfeasible.
46 Annual holiday celebrated on May, 1.
47 Clarke, Simon and Peter Fairbrother. "After the Coup: the Workers' Movement in the
Transition to a Market Economy." In What About the Workers? by Michael Burawoy,
Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother and Pavel Krotov. London: Verso, p. 194.
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However, the current privatization scheme, leading to the "insider"
ownership and control, does not seem to be profitable in the long run, both
economically and politically. It can virtually destroy the "human capital"
of Arsenal, because, as Sabel and Prokop (1994) argue, the top managers are
not likely to "re-engineer" the enterprise after its privatization:
The property regime allows reorganization precisely because,
as increasingly in the advanced countries, it operates as a
mechanism for regulating the distribution of the gains and
costs of adjustment, not a device for establishing an exclusive
locus of control over resources. ... Managers as a group own a
disproportionate and probably growing share of stock in their
own companies, and it might seem that they are free to
pursue their distinct interests at the expense of
restructuring.48
A carefully planned fragmentation of Arsenal , in my mind, would
help to avert this situation. It will not destroy the enterprise, but only its
old governance structure.49 The fragmentation would help to eliminate
workers' pathological dependence on the state, perpetuated in the form of
managerial paternalism, and to promote initiative and entrepreneurship
among the high-skilled workers. Finally, it would mean the elimination
of the Soviet institution of "full employment" when equally low working
and living conditions for everyone are achieved through the repression of
individual productivity and mobility.
48 Sabel, Charles and Jane Prokop. 1994. Stabilization Through Reorganization? Some
Preliminary Implications of Russia's Entry Into World Markets in the Age of Discursive
Quality Standards. Paper presented at the World Bank conference "Corporate Governance
in Central Europe and Russia." Transition Economics Division, p. 19.
49 One could even interpret the fragmentation as Schumpeterian "creative destruction."
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Appendices
1. Arsenal's Profile
Arsenal was founded in 1764 in the very center of Kiev as a rifle and artillery
enterprise. It is the only industrial enterprise in Ukraine that has been established
before the country became a part of the Russian Empire at the end of eighteenth
century. Until recently one could find at Arsenal a third and even fourth generation
workers, descendants of masters whose crafts were as well known in Europe as their
counterparts at Tula in Russia.
After the socialist revolution Arsenal was subordinated to the all-union
Ministry in Moscow. After the W.W.II it began to specialize in manufacturing optical
and optomechanical devices and systems, elements of missile complexes and aircraft
technology devices (i.e. gyrocompasses, tachometers, systems for azimuth orientation
of lenses, dynamic infrared systems for search and shadowing, helmet control
systems, etc.).
Arsenal also specializes in measuring devices used to make monobloc lasers for
SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles, military cameras, etc. The enterprise's civil
production includes equipment for banks, medical equipment, consumer cameras,
ignition devices, fog headlights, mirrors for cars and motorcycles.
Arsenal's technology includes mechanical processing, molding, tooling,
assembly and electrical wiring production and equipment for large and superlarge
microassemblies. Recently Arsenal set up a joint venture with a Polish company to
produce complex medical equipment.
It has also negotiated several other joint venture projects with American,
German, Italian, and South East Asian manufacturers for the development and
production of high-precision microscope lenses for medical instruments, blood
analyzers, infrared imaging diagnostic equipment, polyprofile medical and ecological
express-indicators, laser video players, optical disk memory, etc.
As a part of its assets, Arsenal has four dining halls, nineteen refreshment
rooms, a cafe, two grocery stores, two clothing stores, and two farms. It has its own
housing, a polyclinic, a preventive care center, a museum, a community center, nine
kindergartens (with two under construction), seven gardening associations with a
total of 1,322 country garden plots (priusadebnyi uchastok), and several summer
resorts and children camps. In the last fifteen years its approximate employment
was about 10,000.
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2. Average Real Wages in the Industry, 1992-1994, per cent5 o
Periods
1992
1993
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1994
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Average Wage
100
116
121
145
161
191
367
455
510
1,244
1,530
1,959
5,054
4,852
4,832
5,364
5,600
5,975
6,615
7,938
8,321
8,854
9,121
11,050
11,347
CPI Consumer Basket
100
173
223
272
337
430
738
1,015
1,235
2,227
3,700
5,375
10,256
12,225
13,766
14,550
15,408
16,210
16,842
17,151
17,964
18,328
19,057
19,295
20,212
100
141
162
187
209
256
375
428
530
1,325
1,564
2,783
6,651
7,050
8,672
9,625
9,394
9,770
10,366
11,223
11,847
12,061
12,489
13,668
13,799
50 Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Ukraine.
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3. Letter to the Editor of the News from Ukraine (September, 1994)
Help!
We worked at Arsenal and lived in its dormitory for twenty years. In the
beginning three to four of us were living in one room, including married couples with
children. We are unable to rest neither during the day or at night. We coped with
that, however, because we were young, healthy and idealistic. After many years of
suffering we were able to settle, each in one room (some of us even moved to their
own apartments). Unfortunately, it did not last long, and the living conditions were
becoming more and more unbearable each month.
The plumbing system is very old, and it stays unrepaired all the time so that
we don't have hot water for months. Sometimes, we don't get any water at all. Our
kitchens are in terrible condition, the floor under the sinks is all rotten, parts of the
ceilings are falling down, only one of four gas stoves works. The upper-floor rooms
are constantly flooded when it rains.
Our dormitory has four floors. There are twenty five rooms on each floor, but
only two kitchens, two bathrooms, two toilets, and one clothes drier for the each
floor. And for all this we pay as much as other people pay for their well-functioning
apartments.
Recently, the dormitory's administration rented our first floor and the
basement to the commercial structures. They promised us that the money which they
receive from renting will be used for the renovation of the building, but this still
remains a promise. Now the administration without our consent decided to rent the
second floor and wants to squeeze three people in one room again. They justify their
actions by referring to the existing sanitary norm of six square meters 51 per person.
We are afraid that in a few months they will take away the third floor as well, and
we will end up on the street.
We are grownups, and after all we have a right to our own privacy. We
expressed our concerns to Arsenal's administration, to our union, to our regional
deputy, and to the regional women's committee, but all these petitions except one
remained without a response. Arsenal's administration said: "Don't even think about
individual rooms."
Our salaries are much lower than the minimum rent of about 918 thousand
karbovantsi52 a month elsewhere. We also don't have any guarantees that the costs of
living will not increase even higher. We gave our youth and health to Arsenal and we
believe that we deserve a better treatment.
51 About 54 square feet.
52 At the time the letter was written, about $25 a month.
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